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Finite-key analysis for the 1-decoy state QKD protocol
Davide Rusca,∗ Alberto Boaron, Fadri Gru¨nenfelder, Anthony Martin, and Hugo Zbinden
Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva,
Chemin de Pinchat 22, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
It has been shown that in the asymptotic case of infinite-key length, the 2-decoy state QKD
protocol outperforms the 1-decoy state protocol. Here, we present a finite-key analysis of the 1-decoy
method. Interestingly, we find that for practical block sizes of up to 108 bits, the 1-decoy protocol
achieves for almost all experimental settings higher secret key rates than the 2-decoy protocol. Since
using only one decoy is also easier to implement, we conclude that it is the best choice for QKD, in
most common practical scenarios.
Quantum Key Distribution has been originally de-
signed to work with true single-photons [1]. How-
ever, more than 30 years later, suitable deterministic
single-photon sources are still not available. Therefore
in most experimental setups, convenient weak coherent
laser pulses are used [2, 3]. Weak coherent pulses are vul-
nerable to the so called photon number splitting (PNS)
attack exploiting multi-photon pulses [4, 5]. This attack
can be mitigated using small average photon numbers µ,
or particular protocols which are more resistant by de-
sign [6–8]. However, arguably the most efficient counter-
measure is the so-called decoy-method [9, 10]. In this
method Alice chooses randomly the average photon num-
ber among different levels µi and analyses statistically
the probabilities of detection at Bobs in order to detect
a possible PNS attack.
The decoy state protocol was proposed by Hwang [9]
and the first complete security proof of the decoy-method
was given in 2005 by Lo et al [10] for an infinite amount
of intensities.Wang [11] showed, instead, that it was pos-
sible to employ the decoy method with only three inten-
sities, i.e. two decoys and one signal state. Later Ma et
al. [12] demonstrated that in the optimal configuration,
one of the two decoys must be set close to the vacuum
state (vacuum + weak decoy state protocol). In the same
work, a simpler method with only two intensities was pre-
sented as well, i.e. a signal and a decoy states. Its secu-
rity was proved, but the achieved SKR was slightly below
the 2-decoy protocol. However the analysis did not take
into account the statistical correction due to a finite-key
length. This was first done by Hayashi et al. [13] and
then by Lim et al. [14], using a simpler approach, but
still only for the 2-decoy configuration.
In this paper, we compare the performance of 1-decoy
and 2-decoy levels approaches, following the method used
by Lim et al. in 2014. Taking into account finite size
effects, we show that, interestingly, for most experimental
settings the use of only 1-decoy level is advantageous.
The previous finite-key analysis of the 2-decoy method,
bounded the secret key length of the protocol to the quan-
tity [14]:
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l ≤sl
Z,0 + s
l
Z,1(1− h(φ
u
Z
))− λEC
− a log2(b/ǫsec)− log2(2/ǫcor), (1)
where sl
Z,0 is the lower bound on the vacuum events
(sZ,0); those events where Bob had a detection and the
pulse sent by Alice contained no photons, sl
Z,1 is the lower
bound on the single-photon events (sZ,1), defined by the
number of detections at Bob side when the pulse sent by
Alice contained only one photon, φu
Z
is the upper bound
on the phase error rate (φZ), λEC is the number of dis-
closed bits in the error correction stage, ǫsec and ǫcor are
the secrecy and correctness parameters and a and b de-
pend on the specific security analysis taken into account
(a = 6 and b = 21 for the 2-decoy approach and a = 6
and b = 19 for the 1-decoy protocol, see supplementary
material for details).
The main contribution to the secret key is given by the
single-photon events, estimated by the following formula:
sZ,1 ≥ s
l
Z,1 :=
τ1µ1
µ1(µ2 − µ3)− µ22 + µ
2
3
(
n−
Z,µ2
−n+
Z,µ3
+
(µ22 − µ
2
3)
µ21
(
sZ,0
τ0
− n+
Z,µ1
))
, (2)
where τn is the total probability to send an n-photon
state and n±
Z,k is the finite-key correction, obtained by
using the Hoeffding’s inequality [15], of the number of
detections in the Z basis due to the state of intensity
k ∈ {µ1, µ2, µ3}:
n±
Z,k :=
ek
pk
(
nZ,k ±
√
nZ
2
log
1
ε1
)
. (3)
In order to find the lower bound on this expression, an-
other lower bound on the vacuum events sZ,0 is needed.
This is easily obtained by applying the decoy state anal-
ysis [14].
Here we continue on the same path and apply the
finite-key analysis to the 1-decoy protocol (see supple-
mentary material for more details). Our analysis re-
sults in a secret key length bound of the same form of
Eq. (A25). The main difference is given by the estima-
tion of the single-photon events. In fact without a third
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FIG. 1: (a) Comparison between different PA block sizes of the obtainable SKR considering a repetition rate of
1GHz. For each block size the two protocols are shown: continuous line for the 1-decoy method and dashed line for
the 2-decoy method. (b) Analysis of the percentage difference between the two protocols for different PA block sizes.
(SKRdifference = SKR1D−SKR2D
SKR2D
).
intensity level the lower bound of this quantity changes
to the form:
sZ,1 ≥ s
l
Z,1 :=
τ1µ1
µ2(µ1 − µ2)
(
n−
Z,µ2
−
µ22
µ21
n+
Z,µ1
−
(µ21 − µ
2
2)
µ21
su
Z,0
τ0
)
. (4)
In this case, differently from the previous approach, the
number of vacuum events must be upper bounded. In
order to achieve this we take into account that the prob-
ability of error from a vacuum event is 1/2. We cannot
directly measure this quantity, but we can upper bound
it by the total number of errors mZ,k, for the intensity k.
Considering the finite-key correction, we obtain the fol-
lowing relation (see the supplementary materials for the
derivation):
sZ,0 ≤ s
u
Z,0 := 2
(
τ0
ek
pk
(
mZ,k +
√
mZ
2
log
1
ε2
)
+
√
nZ
2
log
1
ε1
)
. (5)
This is a pessimistic estimate given that the number
of errors is not only due to vacuum events, i.e. dark
counts and after-pulsing of the detector and counts due
to parasitic light, but also by imperfections in the prepa-
ration and measurement apparatus and quantum channel
de-coherence that result in a non vacuum state error.
In our simulation to maximise the SKR for a given
global attenuation (η), we fix a number of parameters
that depend on the characteristics of the devices and
we optimize over a set of variables that can be easily
tuned experimentally. For practicality, the efficiency of
the detector and the internal losses of Bob’s apparatus
are included in the global attenuation η. The parameters
considered are the probability of dark-count (pDC), the
detector dead-time (τDT) and the alignment imperfection
of the devices (pErr). For a given set of these parameters,
we optimize the SKR over the different decoy state vari-
ables, i.e. µi and the associated probability pµi , and the
probability to choose the Z basis for Alice (pZa) and Bob
(pZb).
The analysis in the asymptotic case was already car-
ried out in previous works. Now, considering the finite-
key scenario, the most important parameter is the num-
ber of detections in the Z basis. This defines the pri-
vacy amplification (PA) block size nZ which is included
in our analysis by the Hoeffding’s correction. In addi-
tion we set the secrecy and correctness parameters (ǫsec
and ǫcor) to the values 10
−9 and 10−15 respectively, sim-
ilarly to what is commonly used in literature [14, 16–18].
In FIG. 1(a), we plot the SKR for the two different ap-
proaches and for four PA block sizes. We consider a
system working at a repetition rate of 1 GHz which, as
an order of magnitude, represents the source’s state of
the art in QKD technologies [17, 18]. For the detection
apparatus, we refer to recent superconducting nanowire
single-photon detectors (SNSPD) [19] which have a dead-
time τDT = 100 ns, dark-count rate (DCR) of 10Hz which
correspond to pDC = 10
−8 and an efficiency (ηdet around
50%). In the supplementary material, we show also the
analysis taking into account an InGaAs detector [20].
The dead-time is responsible for the saturation of the
SKR at short distances, whereas the DCR at long dis-
tances is the cause of the fast drop of the SKR. Indeed
in this regime the amount of valid detections becomes
comparable to the random detector’s dark counts, which
raises the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER). We choose
a typical value pErr of 1%.
3In this paragraph we will analyse the effect of differ-
ent PA block sizes to our security analysis. As we see
from FIG. 1(a), by increasing the block size we increase
slightly the SKR as well as the maximum transmission
distance. But, in this way, the time needed to collect the
data increases proportionally to the PA block size. For
this reason, in real application it is preferable to use a
small PA block size. By doing this, it becomes apparent
from our simulation (FIG. 1(b)) that deploying 1-decoy
is advantageous in most configurations. For attenuations
going from 10 dB up to 60 dB it is apparent that, unless
a really big (> 1011) or really small (< 105) PA block size
is applied, the simpler approach gives a higher SKR. For
block sizes smaller than 105 we see that for an attenua-
tion between 40 dB and 60 dB (FIG. 1(b)) the advantage
of the 1-decoy protocol is still present. Moreover for small
attenuation there is no practical reason to use small PA
block sizes, in fact even for nz = 10
7 at 40 dB the acqui-
sition time does not exceed few minutes as presented in
(FIG. 2).
Intuitively in an infinite-key scenario, sending the vac-
uum state to better estimate the s0 contribution has a
little positive effect on the final SKR. Indeed in this con-
figuration even a small probability to send this intensity
results in a good estimation on the vacuum events. In
the case of a finite-key scenario, instead, this probability
starts to be significant for reasonable block sizes. Sending
a considerable amount of vacuum states diminishes the
total number of detections, and consequently the SKR
of the protocol. Quantitatively when the block size cho-
sen is nZ = 10
7, the probability to send a vacuum state
(pµ3) is always greater than 10% (see supplementary ma-
terial); in order for this probability to go under 2%, the
block size should be already greater than 1011.
The 2-decoy protocol turns to be useful only for either
really short or really long distances. In the first case,
due to the saturation of the detectors, sending vacuum
states is less detrimental. However the attenuation at
Bob’s side (including the detector efficiency) could be
high enough already at zero distance, that the detectors
are no longer in the saturation regime. In the second
case, even if the key exchange is possible, the results are
not interesting from a practical point of view, since the
SKR obtained is in the order of magnitude of 10 Hz,
whereas the acquisition time starts to exceed one day.
In order to give a better understanding of our thesis, we
show a comparison of acquisition time and SKR for two
block sizes (nZ = 10
7 and nZ = 10
9) at different distances
in Tab. I. We can see that the 1-decoy protocol almost
always outperforms the 2-decoy one. The only exception
within the chosen attenuations appear at 64 dB; in this
case however the accumulation time for a PA block starts
to be impractical.
Also other practical considerations suggest to always
take the 1-decoy approach over the 2-decoy one. Having
to implement only two intensity levels instead of three
can give a net increase, both in terms of performances
and cost efficiency of the whole system. At the same
Distance
26 dB
100 km
46 dB
200 km
56 dB
250 km
64 dB
290 km
nZ = 10
7
SKR
243 kHz
236 kHz
2627 Hz
2503 Hz
227Hz
197Hz
11.3Hz
14.1Hz
Time
14 s
16 s
20min
23min
3.4H
3.9H
26H
31H
nZ = 10
9
SKR
357 kHz
355 kHz
3970 Hz
3881 Hz
356Hz
333Hz
25.5Hz
30.7Hz
Time
17min
18min
23H
24H
10 d
11 d
67 d
75 d
TABLE I: Comparison of SKR obtainable and time
required for 1-decoy and 2-decoys using two different
PA block sizes.
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FIG. 2: Analysis of the time required to the QKD
protocol when different block sizes are chosen. For each
block size the two protocols are considered, continuous
line for the 1-decoy and dashed line for the 2-decoy. For
the simulations a repetition rate of 1 GHz was
considered.
time implementing one more intensity could result in an
increase of the error probability in the preparation pErr
that would decrease the SKR.
To conclude we presented in our work the extension
of the 1-decoy protocol security to the finite-key scenario
using the formalism introduced in the work of Lim et
al. [14]. By comparing the results of the finite-key effects
on both 1-decoy and 2-decoy protocols we show that for
practical block sizes the strategy of deploying the for-
mer protocol is advantageous. Indeed, despite the fact
that we cannot measure the vacuum events directly, we
achieve a higher SKR within a shorter acquisition time.
We would like to stress that even if the difference between
the two protocols is small, in practice they could result
in a huge experimental and economical advantage.
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Appendix A: Calculation of the SKR
In this appendix we will describe how the different
terms of Equation (1) (in the main text) are calculated
from the experimental data.
This analysis follows the previous proof for a 2-decoy
state protocol [14] and the general analysis for the asymp-
totic case done by Ma et al. [12]. In our protocol, we
consider only a set of two intensity levels κ = {µ1, µ2}
where µ1 > µ2. Let us consider the case when the states
are encoded in the Z basis (in the basis X the analysis
follows in the same way) and sZ,n are the detection ob-
served by Bob given that Alice sent an n photon state.
The total number of detections in the Z basis are given
by nZ =
∑∞
n=0 sZ,n. In the asymptotic limit the num-
ber of detection with a specific intensity k should be n∗
Z,k
where:
n∗
Z,k =
∞∑
n=0
pk|nsZ,n, ∀k ∈ κ. (A1)
If we consider now a finite statistics scenario we can use
Hoeffding’s inequality for independent variables [15] by
which we can bound the difference between our observed
data nZ,k and the corresponding asymptotic case n
∗
Z,k, in
the following way:
|n∗Z,k − nZ,k| ≤ δ(nZ, ε1), (A2)
where the former relation holds with a probability 1−2ε1
and δ(nZ, ε1) :=
√
nZ log(1/ε1)/2.
The same considerations hold for the error rate esti-
mation in a given basis. We define the values vZ,n as
the number of errors detected at Bob’s side when Alice
generated an n photon state and mZ =
∑∞
n=0 vZ,n as the
total number of errors in the Z basis. The number of
errors, m∗
Z,k, for a pulse of intensity k, in the asymptotic
case, can be expressed as:
m∗Z,k =
∞∑
n=0
pk|nvZ,n, ∀k ∈ κ. (A3)
Similarly to the previous case, the correction due to finite
statistics is given by:
|m∗Z,k −mZ,k| ≤ δ(mZ, ε2), (A4)
where the expression holds with probability 1− 2ε2.
Bounds on the vacuum and single-photon events
In order to find an analytical bound on the single-
photon events, we have to define the conditional prob-
abilities pk|n. By using the Bayes’ rule and by exploiting
the photon distribution of a coherent state, the following
expression holds:
pk|n =
pk
τn
pn|k =
pk
τn
e−kkn
n!
, (A5)
where τn =
∑
k∈κ pke
−kkn/n! is the total probability to
send an n photon state. Starting from Eq.(A1) with two
different intensities, we can derive:
eµ2nZ,µ2
pµ2
−
eµ1nZ,µ1
pµ1
=
(µ2 − µ1)sZ,1
τ1
+
∞∑
n=2
(µn2 − µ
n
1 )sZ,n
n!τn
≤
(µ2 − µ1)sZ1
τ1
+
(µ22 − µ
2
1)
µ21
∞∑
n=2
µn1 sZ,n
n!τn
, (A6)
where the inequality is simply due to the fact that:
µn2 − µ
n
1 = µ
2
2µ
n−2
2 − µ
2
1µ
n−2
1 ≤ (µ
2
2 − µ
2
1)µ
n−2
1 , (A7)
when n ≥ 2 and µ1 > µ2. If we now consider that the
sum of all the multi-photon events can be written as:
∞∑
n=2
µn1 sZ,n
n!τn
=
eµ1nZ,µ1
pµ1
−
sZ,0
τ0
− µ1
sZ,1
τ1
, (A8)
we can rewrite the previous inequality (A6) as:
eµ2nZ,µ2
pµ2
−
eµ1nZ,µ1
pµ1
≤
(µ2 − µ1)sZ,1
τ1
+
(µ22 − µ
2
1)
µ21
(
eµ1nZ,µ1
pµ1
−
sZ,0
τ0
− µ1
sZ,1
τ1
)
. (A9)
By rearranging the terms in order to isolate the single-
photon contribution sZ,1 we obtain:
sZ,1 ≥
τ1µ1
µ2(µ1 − µ2)
(
eµ2nZ,µ2
pµ2
−
µ22
µ21
eµ1nZ,µ1
pµ1
−
(µ21 − µ
2
2)
µ21
sZ,0
τ0
)
. (A10)
In order for this to be a lower bound on the single-photon
events we have to upper bound the vacuum contribution
in this expression. Unfortunately having only two in-
tensity levels does not allow us to make a tight bound
on this quantity. The upper bound can be obtained by
taking the total number of errors in one basis:
mZ =
∑
k=µ1,µ2
pk|n
∞∑
n=0
vZ,n ≥ vZ,0. (A11)
5Now, in order to relate this quantity to the vacuum events
we use the fact that the expectation value of the errors
due to vacuum (〈vZ,0〉) should be half of the correspond-
ing total events [12]:
〈vZ,0〉
sZ,0
=
1
2
. (A12)
This is justified by the fact that the vacuum events (sZ,0)
carry no information, neither for Bob nor for Eve. This
means that the latter has no chance of gaining any part
of the key and the former has an equal probability of
having an error or a correct detection. By taking into
account the finite size effect on vZ,0, we obtain:
〈vZ,0〉 ≤ vZ,0 + δ(sZ,0, ε1) ≤ mZ + δ(nZ, ε1), (A13)
where the second inequality holds because mZ ≥ vZ,0
and nZ ≥ sZ,0. Even if this last upper bound is not
tight, it is needed since the values vZ,0 and sZ,0 are not
directly available in the experiment, whilemZ and nZ are.
Finally, combining Eq.(A12) and Eq.(A13), we obtain the
upper bound on sZ,0:
sZ,0 ≤ s
u
Z,0 := 2 (mZ + δ(nZ, ε1)) . (A14)
Another analogous way to obtain an upper bound on
the vacuum events is to consider only the errors relative
to one intensity. In this case we have the relation:
m∗Z,k =
∞∑
n=0
pk|nvZ,n =
∞∑
n=0
pk
τn
e−kkn
n!
vZ,n
≥
pk
τo
e−kvZ,0 =
pk
τo
e−kvZ,0. (A15)
As said in the main text the second approach was cho-
sen, which proved to give the best SKR. In this scenario
by taking into account the finite-key statistic the upper
bound becomes:
sZ,0 ≤ s
u
Z,0 := 2
(
τ0
ek
pk
(mZ,k + δ(mZ, ε1))
+δ(nZ, ε1)
)
. (A16)
By implementing this last result in the inequality
(A10) and applying the finite-key corrections to it, we
obtain:
sZ,1 ≥ s
l
Z,1 :=
τ1µ1
µ2(µ1 − µ2)
(
n−
Z,µ2
−
µ22
µ21
n+
Z,µ1
−
(µ21 − µ
2
2)
µ21
su
Z,0
τ0
)
, (A17)
where we defined:
n±
Z,k := (nZ,k ± δ(nZ, ε1)) , ∀k ∈ κ. (A18)
The lower bound on the vacuum events, in the finite-key
scenario, is given by the formula [14]:
sZ,0 ≥ s
l
Z,0 :=
τ0
µ1 − µ2
(
µ1n
−
Z,µ2
− µ2n
+
Z,µ1
)
. (A19)
Phase error rate
In order to estimate the phase error in the Z basis, the
following formula can be used [21]:
φZ :=
cZ,1
sZ,1
≤
vX,1
sX,1
+ γ
(
εsec,
vX,1
sX,1
, sZ,1, sX,1
)
, (A20)
where:
γ (a, b, c, d)
=
√
(c+ d)(1 − b)b
cd log 2
log2
(
c+ d
cd(1− b)b
212
a2
)
. (A21)
Now by using the same result as in [14] we can upper
bound the number of bit errors in the X basis due to
single-photons by the analytic formula that follows:
vX,1 ≤ v
u
X,1 =
τ1
µ1 − µ2
(
m+
X,µ1
−m−
X,µ2
)
. (A22)
With this we can also upper bound the phase error rate
in the Z basis by the formula:
φZ ≤ φ
u
x :=
vu
X,1
sl
X,1
+ γ
(
εsec,
vu
X,1
sl
X,1
, sl
Z,1, s
l
X,1
)
. (A23)
We have now all the terms needed to estimate the se-
cret key length.
Secret Key Length parameters a and b
In case of the 2-decoy approach the complete analysis
was already carried out by Lim et al. [14]. Their security
analysis resulted in the specific values of a = 6, b = 21.
In our work we followed the same security analysis ap-
proach. The only difference is given by the definition of
the security parameter ǫsec. In our analysis in fact this
parameter has the form:
ǫsec = 2 [α1 + 2α2 + α3] + ν + 6ǫ1 + 4ǫ2, (A24)
where α1, α2, α3 and ν are error terms carried out in
the security analysis [14]. The coefficients in front of the
terms ǫ1 and ǫ2 are equal to the number of times the
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concentration inequalities, Eq.(A2) and Eq.(A4) respec-
tively, were implemented in the secret key length formula.
By setting all error terms by a common value ǫ we obtain
ǫsec = 19ǫ which implemented in the security proof per-
mit us to find a secret key length formula for the 1-decoy
approach of the form:
l ≤slZ,0 + s
l
Z,1(1− h(φ
u
Z))− λEC
− 6 log2(19/ǫsec)− log2(2/ǫcor). (A25)
Appendix B: Detection and Error Simulation
In the simulation, as already mentioned in the text,
the total number of detection in the Z basis is fixed (nZ).
In the following section we show how we simulate the
different detections and error events in the Z basis; the
analysis for the X basis is analogous. In order to simulate
the number of detections, nZ,µi , due to a certain intensity
µi we calculate the corresponding fraction of nZ as:
nZ,µi = nZ
PZ,det,µi
PZ,det,tot
. (B1)
In this expression PZ,det,µi is the detection probability in
the Z basis due to a pulse of intensity µi after an attenu-
ation of η, and PZ,det,tot is the sum of these probabilities
over all possible intensities. This probability can be eas-
ily found to be equal to:
PZ,det,µi = cDTPZPµi
((
1− e(−µiη)
)
+ PDC
)
. (B2)
where PZ is the probability that both Alice and Bob chose
the Z basis, Pµi is the probability to send the decoy µi
and cDT is the correction factor due to the dead time
(tDT ) of the detectors. We model this contribution after
the expression:
cdt =
1
1 +RPZ,det,tottDT
, (B3)
where R is the repetition rate of the source.
The error probability is then given by the formula:
PZ,err,µi = cdtPZPµi
((
1− e(−µiη)
)
PErr +
PDC
2
)
,
(B4)
where PErr and PDC are, as already stated in the
manuscript, the probabilities of error due to the mis-
alignment of the set-up and due to the detectors’ dark
counts, respectively.
In order to calculate the QBER on the Z basis, one
can just evaluate the ratio between the total probability
of error and the total probability of detection:
QBER =
mZ
nZ
=
PZ,err,tot
PZ,det,tot
. (B5)
To find the number of errors due to a pulse of intensity
µi we proceed similarly to Eq.(B1):
mZ,µi = nZ
PZ,err,µi
PZ,det,tot
. (B6)
Hence, the number of pulses that need to be sent (Ntot)
in order to obtain a block size of nZ is easily found to be
equal to the following expression:
Ntot =
nZ
PZ,det,tot
. (B7)
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FIG. 5: a) Analysis of the SKR for different PA block sizes. The continuous line represents the 1-decoy protocol
and the dashed line the 2-decoy one. b) Comparison of the difference between the SKR of the 1-decoy and 2-decoy
protocols for different PA block sizes.
Finally the SKR is found by taking the ratio between
the secret key length Eq.(A25) and the total number of
pulse sent and multiplying it by the repetition rate of the
source (R):
SKR =
l
Ntot
R. (B8)
Appendix C: Simulation Variables
We show, for completeness, the values of the differ-
ent variables chosen in the optimization process for both
protocols in case of a chosen block size of 107. In FIG. 3
and FIG. 4 are shown the probabilities pZ = pZa = pZb
and pµi and the mean photon number µi of the signal
and decoy state as a function of the attenuation. The
intensities are small for low attenuations, since in this
regime the detectors are saturated. For higher attenu-
ations they then increase and remain constant at their
optimal values. The probability to choose the Z basis for
Alice and Bob cannot be taken equal to one due to the
finite block size: a part of the pulses sent must be used to
estimate the phase error rate using the complementary X
basis. In the analysis of the 2-decoy protocol (FIG. 4) we
want to outline that the probability to send the vacuum
state µ3 is non negligible for all attenuations: even at its
minimum value it remains always greater than 11%.
Appendix D: Simulation with InGaAs Detectors
In this section we show the behaviour of the SKR ob-
tained by modelling an InGaAs detector [20] with a DCR
of 1Hz and a dead time of 20µs.
The higher dead time of these detectors, compared to
the SNSPDs, increases the attenuation interval in which
the SKR is mainly limited by the saturation of the de-
tectors (FIG. 5a). As a direct consequence, the atten-
uation range in which the 2-decoy protocol outperforms
the 1-decoy one also increases (FIG. 5b). This is due to
the advantages of the 2-decoy protocol in this regime ex-
plained in the main text. Nevertheless, for attenuations
between 30 dB and 70 dB, the 1-decoy protocol results
in the best SKR for practical PA block sizes.
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